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Abstract 
This paper studies the determinants of the probability of participating in a 
process of merging or acquisition for financial institutions in Colombia. We 
use survival analysis techniques and competing risks models to estimate the 
probability of participating in such processes as an acquiring or acquired 
firm. Using an especially rich database containing financial information of 
Colombian  banks  for  the  period  1990  –  2007,  we  find  that  both 
macroeconomic and microeconomic variables are important determinants of 
such  probability.  However, there  are  differential effects  for  the  acquiring 
firm and the acquired firm. Particularly, while firm size and solvency result 
significant  determinants  of  the  probability  of  being  an  acquiring  firm, 
efficiency is an important determinant of the probability of being acquired. 
Also, the concentration index, that plays no role for acquiring firms, plays an 
important role in the probability of being acquired. 
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There  is  a  wide  economic  literature  studying  mergers  and  acquisitions  (M&A). 
Theoretical literature on the topic focuses on explaining causes and consequences of 
these processes. According to neoclassical economic theory, integration events obey 
profit  maximization  logic.  Two  or  more  firms  decide  to  vertically  or  horizontally 
integrate in order to benefit from economies of scale or scope, or from a larger market 
power.  Integrations  may  also  take  place  in  order  to  achieve  more  efficiency  in 
management. More generally, the main reason argued in favor of capital reallocations 
among firms, is the search of its most productive use (Tirole, 2006). There are also 
other reasons different from the profit maximization behavior that may lead to M&A 
and relate to managerial objectives (Meschi, 1997). 
The effects of M&A have long been studied since the seminal work of Bain (1951). 
Integration processes have been considered to have welfare effects in the sense that they 
can potentially change the competitive structure of markets, favoring increases in mark-
ups  for  the  firms  that  integrate.  However,  M&A  can  also  lead  to  gains  in  cost 
efficiencies, which translate into welfare gains. Williamson (1968) argues that the net 
effect of an integration process on social welfare results from the balance of a welfare 
loss generated by the increase in prices and a welfare gain produced by cost efficiencies 
that lead to price reductions. In order to study these trade-offs, different models have 
been  developed  by  industrial  organization  theorists.  These  models  can  be  generally 
classified under the categories of non-cooperative oligopoly models (e.g. Levin, 1990) 
and collusion models (e.g. Chamberlin, 1956). 
The empirical literature on M&A has concentrated in studying the efficiency gains (or 
losses) of these processes on different markets. Many studies analyze the effects of M&A on firms´ efficiency, emphasizing on their effects on transactional and operational 
costs. The idea  behind most of  these  studies is  that firms with a higher production 
capacity have lower plant adjustment costs and a lower failure probability (regarding 
financial firms, see for instance Focarelli et. Al, 1999; Bracho et. Al, 2002; Azofra et. 
Al, 2006; Hannan and Pillof, 2006; and, Ayala et. Al, 2007). 
The seminal works on M&A in the financial sector present case studies of the main 
integration processes in different countries, such as the USA, Russia, Italy, and more 
recently Venezuela and Colombia. These studies make a qualitative analysis of their 
effects  in  terms  of  market  concentration  and  the  price  of  financial  services.  They 
differentiate between cost efficiency and benefit efficiency, also known as X-efficiency 
(e.g., Rhoades, 1996, Carree, 2003, and Clavijo, 2006). 
From the empirical evidence point of view, the determinants of M&A processes have 
been studied using probabilistic models. Recently, most studies use survival analysis 
techniques to model the conditional probability of participating in an integration event 
(see, for instance, Hannan and Pillof, 2006, Ayala et. Al, 2007, and García-Suaza and 
Gómez-González, 2009). A common result has been obtained in these studies: a good 
firm performance reduces the probability of participating in a M&A process.  
However, in general these studies do not make explicit reference to the difference that 
may exist between participating as an acquiring institution or an acquired firm. There 
are  good  reasons  to  think  that  the  significant  determinants  of  participating  as  an 
acquiring  institution  or  an  acquired  firm  are  different,  and  thus  cannot  be  properly 
identified by a model in which the risks of being acquired and of acquiring are not 
modeled separately. Indeed, a model in which both risks are pooled in just one category 
can induce to a misunderstanding of the determinants of the probability of participating in  an  integration  process.  For  instance,  as  it  was  mentioned  above,  most  empirical 
studies  suggest  that  a  bank  in  good  financial  health  has  a  lower  probability  of 
participating in that process that a bank with poor financial health. Nevertheless, one 
can  think  that  an  entity  with  a  good  financial  health  has  a  greater  probability  of 
participating in a process of M&A as an acquiring institution that an entity with bad 
financial health. 
This  study  contributes  to  the  literature  on  the  determinants  of  the  probability  of 
participating in an integration event, using an especially rich data set from financial 
sector institutions of Colombia, for the period 1990 – 2007
1. We estimate a competing 
risks model using survival analysis techniques, in which the risks of participating as an 
acquiring or an acquired firm are modeled separately. We show that the significant 
determinants of both probabilities are different, as expected. In particular, while firm 
size and solvency result significant determinants of the probability of being an acquiring 
firm, efficiency is an important determinant of the probability of being acquired. Also, 
the concentration index, that plays no role for acquiring firms, plays an important role in 
the  probability  of  being  acquired.  We  also  show  that  the  effect  of  macroeconomic 
variables on the probability of participating in an M&A process respond to the stage of 
the  economic  cycle.  Particularly,  the  effect  of  GDP  growth  is  larger  in  periods  of 
economic recession. 
Section 2 presents a brief survey of the empirical studies concerning the determinants of 
M&A. Section 3 presents the data used in the empirical analysis, the empirical model, 
and estimation results. Finally, section 4 presents conclusions. 
                                                              
1 The dataset used in this study is especially rich because considers monthly data from the balance sheets 
of all financial  institutions existing in Colombia during the  observation period.  We  benefit from the 
information provided by a time of financial stress in which many integration processes – and also failures 
– occurred. For more in the period of financial stress and its consequences on the banking industry, see 
Gómez-González and Kiefer (2009). 2.  Review of Related Empirical Literature 
From the point of view of this study, the empirical literature on the topic can be divided 
in  two  groups.  The  first  group  corresponds  to  the  literature  on  the  causes  and 
consequences  of M&A events.  The  second group  corresponds to empirical analyses 
using probability models to estimate the probability of participating in these actions. 
The first group is characterized by case studies and estimations of cost functions to 
explain the role played by efficiency in M&A processes. The evidence about efficiency 
changes is mixed. Rhoades (1998) presents case studies for nine integration events of 
American  banks.  He  considers  three  efficiency  measures  –  scale  efficiency,  X-
efficiency, and total efficiency – and  obtains evidence  that suggests that the events 
considered  generated  cost  efficiency  gains  in  all  cases.  However,  benefit  efficiency 
gains only happened in some of the cases. 
Pillof  and  Santomero  (1996)  use  two  alternative  methods  to  estimate  the  effect  of 
integration events on efficiency and the value of those operations. The first method 
consists in comparing institutional unemployment – or efficiency – before and after the 
integration process. The second method consists in analyzing market reactions after the 
announcement of a M&A process. The study finds that there are no significant changes 
in terms of efficiency. 
Houston et. Al (2001) analyses the merging processes of a group of large American 
banks  between  1985  and  1996,  and  evaluates  the  market-extension  effects  of  these 
processes.  The  study  estimates  a  positive  average  value  of  the  integration  events 
considered. Huzinga et. Al (2001) makes a similar study using information from the 
Euro zone, and includes 52 mergers and acquisitions that happened between 1994 and 1998. The study finds evidence in favor of the absence of scale economies and X-
efficiency. 
In contrast to the findings of Huzinga et. Al (2001), Díaz et. Al (2004) find evidence in 
favor of efficiency gains generated by M&A´s of banks in the Euro zone, using panel 
data methodologies and a sample of banks from 1993 to 2000. 
The  second  group  is  characterized  by  empirical  approximations  using  probabilistic 
models to estimate the probability of participating in these actions. The seminal works 
in this group are Hannan and Rhoades (1987) and Amel and Rhoades (1989). The first 
study uses a sample of more than 1000 Texas banks between 1970 and 1982, and shows 
that  financial  institutions  with  large  market  share,  low  capital  to  asset  ratio  and 
operations in rural areas are relatively more likely of being acquired. The second study 
uses  a  sample  of  1724  American  banks  between  1978  and  1983,  and  shows  that 
profitability, firm growth, and market share, are variables that influence significantly the 
probability of participating in a merging process. 
Focarelli et. Al (1999) analyzes the Italian banking industry between 1985 and 1996, 
and studies separately merging and acquisition processes. The paper considers aspects 
not included in other studies, such as regulation and technical change. A multinomial 
logit model is estimated, in which the outcomes of the dependent variable distinguish 
between a bank that participates in an acquisition and a bank that merges. The main 
finding of the paper is that mergers and acquisitions are determined by different factors, 
and  thus  the  authors  suggest  that  these  integrations  processes  should  be  studies 
separately when possible
2. 
                                                              
2 Generally, it is not possible to differentiate between a merging process and an acquisition process. For 
example, in Colombia all integration processes are catalogued as acquisitions by the Superintendency of 
Financial Institutions – the regulator of the financial system in Colombia. Hannan and Pillof (2006) use a proportional hazards model to estimate the conditional 
probability of being acquired for a large sample of American banks between 1996 and 
2003. The authors use a competing risks model to differentiate between the risks that an 
institution faces of being acquired by an inside-market or an outside-market institution
3. 
The  main  result  is  that  acquisitions  serve  to  transfer  resources  from  less  efficient 
institutions to more efficient ones. 
In  Colombia,  the  only  existing  related  study  is  the  one  done  by  García-Suaza  and 
Gómez-González (2009). The authors estimate a proportional hazards model and show, 
using a sample of Colombian financial institutions during the period 1990 – 2007, that 
institutions in good financial health are less likely to participate in an integration event. 
They also show that macroeconomic variables – economic growth and the Herfindahl 
index – are significant determinants of the probability of merging. However, they do not 
consider institutions participating actively and passively separately. 
3.  Data, Empirical Model, and Estimation Results 
3.1 Data 
In  1990  there  were  80  financial  institutions  in  Colombia.  Around  30%  of  these 
institutions  were  commercial  banks,  and  the  rest  were  financial  corporations  and 
financial companies
4. At the beginning of the 1990s a process of financial openness was 
undertaken in Colombia, and with it international banks settled in the country. In 1996 
the total number of institutions increased to a number of 132. However, the important 
                                                              
3  For  the  case  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  in  the  Colombian  financial  sector,  this  differentiation  is 
unimportant, because all such processes occur between institutions operating in the same industry.  
4 In Colombia, although there are some differences between commercial banks and financial companies, 
due to liability  composition  and size, in practical terms both types  of institutions  serve  very  similar 
purposes and compete in the issuance of loans and deposits. The main difference can be found in demand 
deposits: while commercial banks can issue checking accounts, financial companies cannot. Nevertheless, 
financial  companies  can  issue  saving  deposits  and  time  deposits.  Another  difference  is  the  required 
amount of initial capital: the minimum required capital to constitute a bank is almost three times as big as 
that needed to constitute a financial company. Nevertheless, initial capital requirements are small vis-à-
vis the size of the intermediaries once they are operating (Gómez-González and Kiefer, 2009). growth in the number of financial firms experienced during the first part of the decade 
was reverted with the financial crisis of the late 1990s. By the year 2000, the number of 
entities in the financial sector was reduced to one half, and financial intermediation 
shrunk. The reduction in the number of entities was especially noticeable in the group of 
financial corporations and financial companies, with more than a 60% reduction. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis there was an important recovery in financial 
intermediation, but the number of institutions continued decreasing. In 2007 only 44 
institutions  remained  in  the  financial  sector,  and  banks  represented  a  41%  of  these 
number (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Number of financial institutions 1990 - 2007 
 
Source: Colombian Financial Superintendency and authors´ calculations. 
 
As a result, since 1996 the Colombian financial sector has experienced an increase in 
concentration that can be observed in Figure 2, which presents the Herfindahl Index for 
the assets of the financial system. This increase in concentration obeyed two different 
reasons: i). an important number of failures of financial institutions during the period of 
financial crisis; and, ii). a considerable number of M&A that took place as safeguarding 
mechanisms during the financial crisis, and as processes of market expansion during the 
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Banks F Corps F CompsFigure 2. Herfindahl Index 1990 – 2007 
 
Source: Colombian Financial Superintendency and authors´ calculations. 
 
During  1990  and  2007 a  total  of  124  M&A  took  place  in the  Colombian financial 
industry; 68% of these processes occurred among institutions belonging to the same 
type of institution, mainly banks. Figure 3 shows the time distribution of the integration 
events. 
Figure 3. Time distribution of M&A 
 
Source: Colombian Financial Superintendency and authors´ calculations. 
 
 
It can be seen from Figure 3 that integration events were not evenly distributed in time. 
Between 1990 and 1996 there were 20 integration processes, between 1997 and 2000 – 
period of financial crisis – 75 events were counted, and between 2001 and 2007 29 































































































































































1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007In  this  paper  the  observation  period  is  1990  –  2007.  The  frequency  of  the  data  is 
quarterly, and all institutions are in the same fiscal year. Financial data was collected for 
each  of  the  financial  institutions  considered  for  the  empirical  analysis.  Following 
previous  studies  and  theoretical  expectations,  the  following  financial  ratios  were 
considered  in  the  explanation  of  time  to  participate  in  an  integration  process:  size 
(SIZE), defined as the natural logarithm of assets; profitability (PROF), given by the 
ratio of annualized profits to average annual assets; solvency (SOLV), defined as the 
ratio of equity to assets; liquidity (LIQ), given by the ratio of short-term assets to short-
term liabilities; leverage (LEV), defined as the ratio of total liability to total capital; and, 
efficiency (EFF), approximated by the ratio of operating expenses to average annual 
assets. These financial indicators are proxies of the variables traditionally considered in 
the literature. 
Additionally, we considered two macroeconomic variables, to control for the stage of 
the business cycle and the degree of market concentration: GDP growth (GROWTH), 
measured as the annual rate of growth of GDP; and the Herfindahl Index of assets (HH), 
that not only controls for market concentration but also for the existence of possible 
inertial effects in merging processes
5. 
The data set used to construct the variables consists of information in the balance sheets 
that financial institutions have to report to the Colombian Financial Superintendency.  
3.2 Empirical Model 
In this study, we estimate a competing risks model using survival analysis techniques, in 
which  the  risks  of  participating  as  an  acquiring  or  an  acquired  firm  are  modeled 
                                                              
5 In order to test for  possible multicolinearity problems, we calculated correlations  between  pairs  of 
variables, for all the variables included in the estimations. We found that all such correlations were lower 
than 40% in absolute value. separately. In duration models, the dependent variable is duration, the time that takes a 
system to change from one state to another. In the case of interest, duration is the time 
that takes for a financial institution to acquire another one or to be acquired by another 
one. 
In  this  study,  we  use  the  semi-parametric  specification  proposed  by  Cox  (1972)  to 
characterize duration
6. We do not use a parametric specification because the baseline 
hazard in our formulation reflects changes in the regulatory environment common to all 
the included institutions, and also changes in macroeconomic performance that may not 
be properly controlled by the macroeconomic variables included in the model. There is 
no reason to think these will correspond to a monotonic hazard, and indeed we find 
evidence it does not (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Unconditional (no covariates) non-parametric hazard function 
 




                                                              
6 Some empirical studies use parametric models to characterize the duration of a spell. Commonly used 
distributions are  the exponential,  the Weibull  and the  Gompertz.  The  exponential  implies  a  constant 
hazard while the Weibull admits decreasing or increasing hazards. The Gompertz distribution allows non-
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Hazard FunctionThe  pattern  of  integration  for  banks  and  other  financial  institutions  was  similar  in 
percentage terms. That suggests that the survival functions of both groups might be 
similar. Figure 5 shows the Kaplan – Meier estimator of the survival function for both 
groups of intermediaries. 
Figure 5. Kaplan – Meier estimator of the unconditional (no covariates) survival 
function by type of institution 
 
Source: Colombian Financial Superintendency and authors´ calculations. 
 
 These  look  similar.  In  order  to  corroborate  that  intuition,  tests  of  equality  of  the 
survival functions were done. Table 1 shows the results of these tests. Note that these 
tests are crude and exploratory because they do not condition on the institution- specific 
financial  variables.  Nevertheless,  they  give  us  some  confidence  that  pooling  is 
appropriate. Therefore, in the rest of the paper we treat all the institutions as one group. 
The Kaplan-Meier survival function for the whole group of institutions is shown in 
Figure 6. 
Table 1. Test for equality of the survivor functions 
Test  Log Rank  Wilcoxon  Cox 
chi2(2)  3.96  2.66  3.87 
Pr>chi2  0.1378  0.264  0.1446 
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Kaplan-Meier by insitutionFigure 6. Kaplan – Meier estimator of the unconditional (no covariates) survival 
function - pooled 
 
Source: Colombian Financial Superintendency and authors´ calculations. 
 
Our  objective  is  to  understand  how  bank-specific  variables  affected  the  conditional 
probability  of  participating  in  an  integration  event  as an  acquiring  institution  or  an 
acquired one.  Building on the above analysis indicating that conventional candidates 
for  parametric models are inappropriate, this  paper estimates a proportional hazards 
model in which no parametric form is assumed for the baseline hazard function. As 
shown below using a specification test, this assumption seems to be appropriate for the 
problem of interest. 
For estimation purposes, we follow Cox (1972) and use the method of partial maxim 
likelihood. The key point of the method is the observation that the ratio of the hazards 
for any two individuals   and   depends on the covariates, but does not depend on 
duration.  The  intuition  behind  this  estimation  method  is  that  without  knowing  the 
baseline hazard only the order of durations provides information about the unknown 
coefficients. Ties are handled by applying the Breslow method. 
As  it  mentioned  above,  every  institution  at  every  point  in  time  has  the  risks  of 
participating  in  an  integration  process  in  an  active  and  passive  way.  Mergers  and 
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CI 95% Survival Function
Survival Function (Kaplan-Meier Estimator)merger is considered as a process of horizontal integration, an acquisition is considered 
as a process of vertical integration. However, in Colombia every integration process 
happening in the financial sector is considered as an acquisition and is catalogued that 
way by the regulator of the sector. Thus, we consider all integration processes here as 
acquisitions. Nevertheless, we differentiate between institutions that participate as the 
acquiring part from  institutions participating as  the  part being  acquired.  In order  to 
model appropriately the two competing risks we are considering in this study, we use a 
competing  risks  model  using  survival  analysis  techniques.  While  each  institution  is 
subject to both risks, researchers can observe at most the realization of one of them – 
the one with least duration –. 
Suppose A represents the event of participating in an integration process as an active – 
acquiring – part, and B represents the event of participating in an integration process as 
a passive – acquired – part. Assuming both events are independent, the hazard function 
for each financial firm is given by 
                             1  
where       represents the hazard function for risk   of each institution, with       ,  . 
The corresponding survival function in this case,      , is given by the product of the 
survival functions corresponding to each of the competing risks 
                          2  
In this context, the individual contribution to the likelihood function of a bank that 
entered into an integration process during the observation period is given by 
                          3  Where      represents  the  marginal  contribution  of  an  individual  changing  to  state    
during the observation period, where       ,  ,   represents the duration of the spell 
for the individual,     is the probability density function of migrating to state  , and     
represents the survival function of maintaining in a state different from  . 
In the other hand, the marginal contribution of censured observations is given by 
                               4  
where the sub-index C stands for censored observation. 
The total individual contribution,  , is then given by 
      
    
    
                5  
where    is an indicator function that takes value one when the individual takes state  , 
for       ,  . 
3.3 Estimation results 
Before presenting the results of the competing risks model, it is useful to present the 
results of an estimation of a proportional hazards model in which the two competing 
risks are pooled in just one risk category, in order to have a benchmark. These results 
are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 presents results both for a proportional hazard model and for three commonly 
used parametric specifications. However, we focus attention on the results of Cox´s specification
7. All the estimated models are globally significant, according to likelihood 
ratio tests. 
Table 2. Estimation results pooling both risk categories 
Variable  Cox  Weibull  Gompertz  Exponential 
SIZE 
0.0936*  0.0904*  0.0878*  0.0845* 
(0.0233)  (0.0308)  (0.0328)  (0.0132) 
PROF  -5.0023*  -1.1441*  -1.1482*  -1.1579* 
(1.0135)  (0.2135)  (0.2129)  (0.1754) 
SOLV  -0.3489*  -0.3821*  -0.3860*  -0.3999* 
(0.0246)  (0.0520)  (0.0529)  (0.0443) 
LIQ  -0.0100*  -0.0138*  -0.0140*  -0.0154* 
(0.0045)  (0.0013)  (0.0014)  (0.0016) 
LEV 
0.0029  0.0040  0.0041  0.0040 
(0.0030)  (0.0026)  (0.0027)  (0.0033) 
EFF 
0.0090*  0.0095*  0.0097*  0.0105* 
(0.0010)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0006) 
GROWTH  -0.0735*  -0.1004*  -0.1033*  -0.1106* 
(0.0136)  (0.0061)  (0.0041)  (0.0073) 
HH  27.9838*  23.2929  13.4969  32.1357 
(12.2263)  (20.2818)  (22.8859)  (16.8953) 
Constant    -9.0048  -6.8167  -6.7543 
  (1.0521)  (1.3589)  (0.8566) 
*Indicates that the covariate is significant at the 5% level. 
Source: Authors´ calculations. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
All models show that all included covariates, except for LEV and HH
8, are statistically 
different than zero. The signs of the explanatory variables are the same under all the 
specifications,  and  are  the  expected  ones  as  identified  in  the  related  literature.  In 
general, the results indicate that the probability of participating in an M&A process 
decreases in the institution´s financial health. In other words, these results suggest that if 
bank     is  in  better  financial  health  that  bank   ,  then  the  former  is  more  likely  to 
integrate  with  another  institution than the latter.  This  result,  standard  in  the  related 
                                                              
7 We performed specification tests for the adequacy of the proportional hazards assumption (Schoenfeld´s 
residuals tests), both for each individual covariate and a global test. In all cases, we could not reject the 
hypothesis of proportional hazards. 
8 HH is significant under the proportional hazards specification only. literature, is subject to change if the risks of acquiring and being acquired are modeled 
separately. 
Table  2  also  shows  that  larger  institutions  are  more  inclined  to  participate  in  an 
integration event than otherwise similar smaller institutions; HH has a positive effect 
though  it  is  only  statistically  different  from  zero  under  the  proportional  hazards 
specification;  and,  economic  growth  has  a  negative  incidence  over  mergers  and 
acquisitions. 
Figure 3 shows that although M&A´s occur during periods of economic expansion and 
economic  contraction,  the  number  of  events  vary  substantially  during  the  business 
cycle. Thus, it results interesting to test whether there is an asymmetric effect of growth 
during the cycle. 
Table 3 exposes the results of the proportional hazards competing risks model, and tests 
for the existence of asymmetric effects of the economic growth  variable during the 
cycle on the probability of participating in an M&A event. 
All the estimated models are globally significant, according to likelihood ratio tests, and 
for all the models the proportional hazards assumption is validated according to the 
results of the Schoenfeld´s residual test individually and globally. 
Considering the pooled model with asymmetric effects for the growth variable, we find 
that  the  signs  and  significance  levels  of  individual  covariates  remains  the  same 
(compared to the pooled model presented in Table 2). Of special interest, the effect of 
economic growth on the probability of interest is negative both during expansions and 
contractions, but it is only significantly different from zero during periods of negative 
growth rate. This result suggests that increases in the growth rate tend to reduce the 
probability of integration events, but this effect is higher during moments in which the economy  is  performing  worse.  This  result  indicates  that  the  growth  rate  of  GDP 
excerpts a non-linear effect over the probability of interest. 
Table 3. Estimation results of the competing risks model including asymmetric 
growth effects 


















SIZE  0.0936*  0.1022*  -0.0487  -0.0492  0.3409*  0.3540* 
(0.0233)  (0.01948)  (0.1683)  (0.1671)  (0.0396)  (0.0352) 
PROF  -5.0023*  -5.1133*  -2.9261  -2.7089  0.1771  0.0414 
(1.0135)  (0.8770)  (2.4377)  (2.2369)  (1.1908)  (13.6764) 
SOLV 
-0.3489*  -0.3228*  -0.0803  -0.0767  -0.4176*  -0.3968 
(0.0246)  (0.0582)  (0.5645)  (0.5725)  (0.1425)  (0.2267) 
LIQ 
-0.0100*  -0.0005  -0.0093  -0.0088  -0.0800  -0.0875 
(0.0045)  (0.0009)  (0.0066)  (0.0062)  (0.0861)  (0.0982) 
LEV  0.0029  0.0023  -0.0224  -0.0221  0.0026  0.0024 
(0.0030)  (0.0023)  (0.1335)  (0.1334)  (0.0027)  (0.0024) 
EFF  0.0090*  -0.0133  0.0094*  0.0090*  0.0024  0.0018 
(0.0010)  (0.0134)  (0.0014)  (0.0013)  (0.0016)  (0.0018) 
GROWTH 
-0.0735*     -0.0849*     -0.0789*    
(0.0136)    (0.0269)    (0.0046)   
GROWTH 
+ 
  -0.0020    -0.0163    0.0186 
  (0.0427)    (0.0760)    (0.0612) 
GROWTH 
- 
  -0.2015*    -0.1909*    -0.2361* 
  (0.0287)    (0.0613)    (0.0298) 
HH 
27.9838*  25.1408*  35.8345*  30.2086*  19.7749  11.9258 
(12.2263)  (7.8761)  (3.0922)  (4.4515)  (17.9184)  (14.7537) 
*Indicates that the covariate is significant at the 5% level. 
Source: Authors´ calculations. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Table 3 shows that the significant determinants of the probabilities of acquiring and of 
being acquired are different, as expected. In particular, while firm size and solvency 
result significant determinants of the probability of being an acquiring firm, efficiency 
is an important determinant of the probability of being acquired. Also, the concentration 
index, that plays no role for acquiring firms, plays an important role in the probability of 
being acquired. Results suggest that a larger, more solvent entity is more likely to participate as an 
acquiring firm, while an inefficient firm has a higher probability of playing the role of 
an acquired firm in an integration process
9. 
 We  also  show  that  the  effect  of  macroeconomic  variables  on  the  probability  of 
participating  in  an  M&A  process  respond  to  the  stage  of  the  economic  cycle. 
Particularly, the effect of GDP growth is larger in periods of economic recession, for 
both cases. As discussed above, in the pooled case, this result is the expected. The 
Herfindhal Index is only statistically significant for the risk of being acquired, but in 
both cases is positive indicating that increments in market concentration increase both 
probabilities (evidence of inertial effects in M&A´s). 
4.  Concluding remarks 
This paper studies the determinants of the probability of participating in a process of 
merging or acquisition for financial institutions in Colombia. We use survival analysis 
techniques and competing risks models to estimate the probability of participating in 
such  processes  as  an  acquiring  or  acquired  firm.  Using  an  especially  rich  database 
containing financial information of Colombian banks for the period 1990 – 2007, we 
find that both macroeconomic and microeconomic variables are important determinants 
of such probability.  
However, there are differential effects for the acquiring firm and the acquired one. Firm 
size and solvency explain significantly the probability of playing the active role in an 
integration  process.  Meanwhile,  efficiency  is  an  important  determinant  of  the 
probability of being acquired. Thus, we find evidence that supports the hypothesis that 
financial health plays an important role in M&A´s, but the role played by particular 
                                                              
9 A positive sign of the coefficient related to EFF means that firms with higher operational costs have a 
higher probability of participating in an integration event. variables  proxying  for  financial  health  is  different  when  considering  both  risks 
separately.  
We  also  show  that  the  effect  of  macroeconomic  variables  on  the  probability  of 
participating  in  an  M&A  process  respond  differently  during  the  business  cycle. 
Particularly, the effect of GDP growth is larger in periods of economic recession, for 
both cases. 
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